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Trust is “the vital bond that unifies leaders with their followers and com-manders with their units.”1 Not only is trust vital for an effective leader, it should also be established quickly based on the nature of the military. 
While trust is important for a successful leader, it may be even more important for 
a commander whose responsibilities include sending Airmen into harm’s way.2
Research has shown that trust is about relationships. Commanders need a rela-
tionship with their followers to have influence over them.3 If commanders were 
better equipped to quickly build genuine trust with their followers, there would 
likely be a significant increase in effectiveness and efficiency. Thus, the purpose of 
this study is to identify actions and tasks that USAF leaders, particularly squadron 
commanders, can use to quickly and effectively build trust within their units.
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Defining Trust
Trust can be a difficult concept to describe exactly; therefore, for many, it is 
easier to describe what trust is not. That is why trust is commonly referred to as 
“being broken” and rarely referred to as “being kept, built, or strengthened.”4 
Herein, trust is defined as a “psychological state comprising willingness to accept 
vulnerability based on positive expectations of a specific other or others.”5 Al-
though there are different definitions of trust, most of the definitions include a 
willingness to accept vulnerability along with the positive expectations of others.
Trust is vital to leadership because the level of trust that followers have in their 
leader directly impacts their willingness to accept that leader’s influence.6 At the 
same time, a leader’s trust in followers makes the leader more open to their influ-
ence.7 A leader–follower relationship built on trust facilitates open communica-
tion, mutual cooperation, mutual dependence, and empowerment, all of which 
greatly enhance both individual and group effectiveness.8
Traditionally, the most widely accepted understanding of trust has been that it 
is something that takes time to develop, build, and strengthen.9 However, research 
into temporary groups and systems has identified that a large degree of trust is 
established early in relationships.10 Swift trust is a unique form of trust that occurs 
between groups or individuals brought together in temporary groups or teams to 
accomplish specific tasks, often under certain time constraints.11 Swift trust, as 
described by Debra Meyerson, Karl E. Weick, and Roderick M. Kramer, has be-
come increasingly popular as a research topic in recent years.12 Swift trust implies 
that trust can be presupposed in certain environments and organizations. That is, 
swift trust is formed quickly out of necessity to manage the issues of uncertainty, 
risk, and perceptions between groups or teams. The concept of swift trust takes 
trust out of the personal form and instead focuses trust based on actions and tasks. 
Thus, swift trust becomes a strategy for groups or individuals as a means to man-
age vulnerability based on their roles rather than focusing on interpersonal rela-
tionships that may not yet have had time to form.13
With the current environment in the USAF where squadron commanders 
typically serve for only two years or less, swift trust may provide an excellent start-
ing point from which to build genuine trust. Deployed commanders must build 
trust within their units even more quickly than a commander in a traditional unit 
given the compressed timelines of downrange command tours. Typically, deploy-
ments are between 4–12 months with a mix of personnel from different units 
around the world. In a deployed environment, the unit is in a heightened readiness 
state and usually closer to a combat zone. In this type of environment, unit mem-
bers typically show up prepared for combat on Day 1 and have little to no time to 
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acclimate to their new unit and members of their unit. There is very little time to 
get to know each other, and in addition to being in a deployed environment, the 
operational requirements and mission set usually carry greater ramifications.
By building upon swift trust, commanders may focus on actions and tasks that 
can develop relationships and build genuine trust more quickly.14 Providing com-
manders with a clear pathway to building trust may create an avenue for increased 
operational performance as well as increased employee organizational commit-
ment and job satisfaction.
Methodology
We collected data from focus groups and individual one- on- one interviews. 
Focus groups are typically composed of 6–10 people with similar backgrounds 
who participate in the interview together for approximately 1-2 hours. These par-
ticipants can make additional comments beyond their own original responses as 
they hear what other participants have to say. The advantages of focus groups in-
clude enriched data quality because of the participant interactions, enhanced 
cost- effectiveness because more people can participate in the same time period 
used for a one- on- one interview, and improved data analysis because the re-
searcher can quickly identify consistent or shared views as well as the extreme and 
diverse opinions.15
Focus group participants are generally selected based on their relevance and 
relationship to the topic of study. Typically, focus group participants are not cho-
sen in an attempt to statistically represent a meaningful population.16 However, 
for this research, we felt it important to capture a representative sample of the 
various Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSC) and the different squadron mission 
sets in the USAF. Focus group participants were randomly selected with consid-
eration to ensure that multiple AFSCs were represented. It is hoped that the 
concepts derived from the focus groups and interviews will generalize to all types 
of units, regardless of their mission sets.
Three focus groups were conducted. The first focus group consisted of eight 
senior noncommissioned officers (SNCO). They offer a unique perspective as to 
what the enlisted force sees from their commander and have been in the USAF 
between 8–30 years. The second focus group consisted of eight company- grade 
officers (CGO). These CGOs provide the unique perspective of having been in 
the USAF typically between 1–10 years and are the backbone of the officer corps. 
The final focus group was conducted with field- grade officers (FGO). Six of the 
seven FGOs in the focus group were already squadron commanders, and the sev-
enth was selected for command.
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We conducted five individual interviews following the focus groups. These in-
terviews helped us to better understand the feelings, thoughts, and intentions of 
the focus group members. The interviews also allowed us to gather anecdotal and 
historical data, which added more context to the data gathered during the focus 
group sessions.
Analysis and Results
Data were collected from the focus groups, individual interviews, and a detailed 
literature review. More than seven hours of interviews with 28 individuals equal-
ing 130 pages of transcripts and 2,100 pages of reviewed literature have gone into 
this research. The data collected from the focus groups and interviews were so 
dense and rich that the researchers decided to “winnow” it, which is a process of 
focusing in on some of the data and disregarding other parts of it.17 Specifically, 
this research focused on the most pertinent and relevant information directly ap-
plicable to the research questions. The most common themes and ideas that kept 
reappearing in the three different focus groups and interviews were the founda-
tion of our analysis.
We aggregated the data collected from the focus groups into four main themes. 
These themes emerged from the data collected during the focus groups and inter-
views and were validated by the in- depth literature review. The data revealed four 
prevalent themes that a commander needs to work through to build trust: Engage, 
Connect, Serve, and Lead. These four themes provide a framework (see fig. 1) for 
the actions and tasks that a commander can do to build genuine trust with their 
Airmen.
SWIFT TRUST FRAMEWORK FOR COMMANDERS
• Clearly identify roles
 and responsibilities
• Set expectations
• Hold people accountable
• Follow through
• Take the initiative (fail forward)
• Seek out feedback and
 address issues
• Be present
• Invest time
• Treat command as a contact sport
• Provide feedback
• Communicate/Listen
• Be transparent
• Be genuine/authentic
• Be honest
• Display passion
• Show vulnerability
• Show empathy
• Get to know your
 people on a
 personal level
• Empower your people
• Develop your people both
 personally and professionally
• Defend your people
• Truly care about the lives and
 careers of your people
LEAD
ENGAGE
CONNECT
SERVE
Figure. Trust- building framework
A Commander’s First Challenge
AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL  SUMMER 2019  19
Engage
To build trust, leaders should meet with their people and communicate regu-
larly and consistently.18 The same sentiments were shared by all three of the focus 
groups. A squadron commander in the FGO focus group stated that “leadership 
is a contact sport.” A commander cannot lead without getting out with their 
troops and doing the job with them. Time spent with an Airman on the job shows 
that the commander values the Airman individually and what that Airman is 
doing. In fact, members of the focus group stated that sometimes the most impor-
tant thing that a commander can do is to “simply show up.” One FGO who re-
cently returned from the Air Mobility Command (AMC) Commander’s Course 
said that the four- star general in charge of AMC was present for almost the entire 
week- long course. The FGO stated, “His presence alone, his just showing up, was 
enough. He did not have to say it was important, we knew it was important to 
him because he was there.” Here, the AMC commander’s actions helped to build 
trust because he showed that he valued the training the new squadron command-
ers were receiving and that it was important and significant for him to be there.
When commanders are present with their Airmen, it provides the opportunity 
for communication to take place and is an opportunity to provide feedback to an 
individual. Members of all three focus groups mentioned communication and 
feedback multiple times as being highly significant to a commander’s ability to 
build trust. In an interview, one squadron commander stated that being “consis-
tent with your communication and then following through with the message that 
you communicated is a demonstration of your trust.” Additionally, this communi-
cation should happen sooner rather than later. A commander or leader cannot 
afford to waste a single opportunity to communicate with their people or delay 
getting to know their unit. Peder Hyllengren has shown that leaders who meet 
regularly and communicate consistently have a more positive impact on trust than 
those leaders who fail to do so.19
Members of all three focus groups mentioned that feedback was virtually non-
existent, specifically constructive feedback (i.e., identifying areas that need im-
provement). Feedback is important because it is intended to improve the indi-
vidual receiving the feedback, and it shows that the commander cares about 
making them better. One first sergeant from the SNCO focus groups stated, “most 
Airmen don’t trust their supervisors, I guarantee it, I have seen it.” Supervisors 
“don’t tell their people when they are doing good or when they are doing bad,” 
thus, “their people think that they do not care,” and trust is diminished. The USAF 
struggles with providing real, constructive feedback and holding individuals ac-
countable when they make a mistake. Not holding people accountable shows in-
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consistency and also diminishes trust. Correcting a mistake can provide an in-
credible opportunity to hold someone accountable, which can build trust.
Connect
The most commonly mentioned factor that a commander needs to build trust 
was transparency. Members of every focus group repeatedly mentioned the com-
mander’s need to be transparent. Transparency implies openness, communication, 
and accountability. This means that a commander cannot have hidden agendas, 
they need to be thorough in all that they do, and they need to explain their 
decision- making process whenever possible. Some people may argue that a com-
mander does not need to explain their decision- making process or why and how 
they came to a certain decision. There are times when this may be true—when a 
decision requires immediate action, and there is no time for an explanation or 
when discipline is involved.
When commanders are not transparent, they need to know that Airmen will 
talk and reach their own conclusions as to why a certain decision was made. At the 
same time, the more trust that commanders have built with their Airmen, the 
more benefit of the doubt their Airmen will provide to the commander. A squad-
ron commander stated that “. . . explaining why we didn’t go where I thought we 
were going to go. For example, I know that I said X is going to happen, X is not 
going to happen, and this is why,” is one of the most important things that he has 
to do as a commander. He continued, saying that as a commander you need to be 
“. . . frank, open and honest. That is what engenders trust.”
The need to be vulnerable and show vulnerability was also mentioned by mem-
bers in every single focus group, including every squadron commander in the 
FGO focus group. This is extremely telling and important to note. Virtually all the 
literature that discussed building trust, mentioned that a leader needs to be vul-
nerable to build trust.20 Specifically, Zand stated that commanders and leaders 
must be vulnerable if they want to build trust with others.21 A maintenance 
squadron commander stated, “Vulnerability must be shown as a commander. 
Showing your own vulnerability and imperfections is really important as is admit-
ting when you make mistakes openly.”
There can be some resistance and hesitance to the idea of a commander being 
vulnerable. Some people relate being vulnerable to having a weakness, being sus-
ceptible to something, or having a flaw. What vulnerability means, in this case, is 
that the commander needs to build a relationship with their Airmen, and by so 
doing the commander potentially opens himself or herself up to criticism. How-
ever, this vulnerability shows that the commander is a real person who is not 
perfect. They are essentially humanizing themselves, which is both respected and 
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appreciated by subordinates. Vulnerability is necessary to build trust. It creates the 
authenticity and genuineness needed to inspire and lead.
If commanders open up and truly get to know their Airmen, trust can be built 
quickly and more effectively than when they do not. To do this, commanders need 
to take every opportunity to communicate with their people and build a rapport. 
As one squadron commander mentioned, “You cannot lead from your office.” 
Commanders cannot afford to sit in their office and keep their distance; they 
cannot afford to waste one day not communicating with their Airmen. A key here 
is to get to know your Airmen on a personal level and not just a professional level. 
A commander should know about subordinates’ families, where they are from, 
what motivates them, and so forth. As one squadron commander stated, “trust is 
earned, and it starts with sponsorship or your first interaction with an individual 
in your organization. Your people need to know who you are, what you stand for, 
and what you are about. Once this connection and relationships are established, 
your trust is being earned.”
Serve
The key for a commander to serve their Airmen is to empower them. Empow-
erment was an especially passionate theme among the SNCOs and the CGOs. 
This again is telling; they were essentially saying that their commanders are not 
empowering them or their subordinates enough. The ability to empower individu-
als can at times be difficult. To empower someone means that you are entrusting 
them to carry out a task and giving them the power to make the required deci-
sions while accomplishing that task. Across all the focus groups, it was clear that 
commanders need to turn over more control to their Airmen and then back them 
up and defend them when they are going about accomplishing the task. As one 
CGO mentioned, “All Airmen have competencies, and you need to empower 
them to carry those out. This allows them to go to the next level and then you can 
turn up the intensity.” Empowering an Airman improves performance, builds 
confidence, and perhaps most importantly, builds trust.22
To properly empower Airmen, commanders should have done their jobs to 
know and train them individually so that they can rely on them to effectively carry 
out the task. If the commander micromanages this process, the commander will 
lose the trust that they were trying to build. A commander can (and must) direct 
and follow- up with the individual they empowered, but they need to be careful to 
not take back the power or authority that they have delegated. If a commander 
takes back the authority that they delegated to the individual (and this take back 
of authority and power was unwarranted), then the Airman will feel betrayed, and 
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trust will be diminished. The entire squadron will see how the commander treated 
the Airman and will lose some degree of trust in the commander.
The commander is still in charge and responsible for the task. If the com-
mander sees the situation taking a turn for the worse, then he or she needs to take 
action. If possible, this action should be taken privately, so as not to embarrass and 
humiliate the Airman they have empowered. Give that Airman an opportunity to 
correct and heed advice (if time and conditions permit). These situations are es-
sential to building trust, and the more that a commander empowers an individual 
to accomplish a task, the quicker trust will be built. Empowerment and task ac-
complishment are key components and essential to establishing trust.
Another component to building trust is to develop your Airman both person-
ally and professionally. Building trust shows that you care about your Airman as 
individuals, and you do not just care about them because they are essential to 
mission accomplishment. Airmen need advice on multiple aspects of life (e.g., 
marriage, finances, education, future job opportunities, and so forth). They need to 
know that their commander cares about them as an individual. If their goals do 
not necessarily fall in line with the goals of the Air Force or the unit, then the 
commander has an opportunity to influence Airmen or to help guide them to 
make the best decision for themselves, their family, the unit, and the USAF. An 
operational support squadron commander stated, “The only thing I really care 
about is. . . [for] the people in my squadron to become better people and to be 
doing great things wherever [that may be] and for them to say that I made myself 
a better person.”
Lead
Naturally, a commander always needs to lead, and their leadership is always on 
display. The key to the trust- building framework is to take action. Commanders 
should act on everything that they say and emphasize to their Airmen. If a com-
mander does not act on what they say, trust is diminished or lost completely. If a 
commander says that something is important, they need to show that it is impor-
tant through their actions.
A key element to action is to clearly identify roles and responsibilities and to set 
expectations. Every Airman needs to understand what is expected of them. There-
fore, it is crucial that commanders clearly communicate their expectations. A lo-
gistics readiness officer in the CGO focus group stated that Airmen “need to 
know what your expectations are, otherwise they cannot meet your expectations.” 
Once expectations are laid out, the commander should then hold people account-
able and provide feedback.
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The idea of failing forward was also a key concept from the focus groups. A 
squadron commander stated that “as a leader, if you instill a culture where failing 
forward is okay and allow people to learn from and make mistakes, then they will 
be more prone to trust leadership, understanding that it is okay to take risks.” 
Commanders should encourage their Airmen to take the initiative and to be cre-
ative and think outside the box. To do this, commanders should allow their Air-
men to take risks. These risks must be smart and calculated with the permission of 
and in communication with the commander. If an Airman will be punished for a 
simple mistake or for taking a smart, calculated risk, they will not innovate. As 
was mentioned several times in the focus groups and the individual interviews, 
what is important here is that the commander needs to encourage critical think-
ing and some degree of risk- taking to become more effective.23
Another key to leading is to seek out feedback and address issues as they arise. 
The commander should be open to new ideas and needs to know the “pulse of the 
squadron.” Great ideas can come from a young Airman or a new lieutenant. Rank 
does not equate to an individual’s ability to think critically or have great and cre-
ative ideas.
Discussion
The USAF values trust and acknowledges its importance. For example, Air 
Force Doctrine Document 1-1 specifically states, “Trust is the vital bond that 
unifies leaders with their followers and commanders with their units. Trust 
makes leaders effective.”24 Additionally, the USAF has taken several steps to 
address this issue. In March 2015, Gen Mark Welsh, the Chief of Staff of the 
Air Force (CSAF), directed the activation of the Profession of Arms Center of 
Excellence (PACE). “PACE is tasked as the USAF champion laser focused on 
infusing Air Force Core Values within the Profession of Arms.” PACE is “com-
mitted to developing Air Force personnel with a professionalism mindset, char-
acter, and core values required to succeed today and well into the future.” PACE 
teaches a course entitled “Professionalism: Enhancing Human Capital.” PACE 
staff travel throughout the USAF and teach about the importance of commit-
ment, loyalty, and trust.25
In December 2015, the CSAF stated that almost every mission area faces criti-
cal manning shortages. The CSAF continued, “we have got to figure out different 
ways of using our people in a more efficient way or we will wear them out. And if 
we lose them, we lose everything.”26 The USAF is, in fact, losing many qualified 
and exceptional individuals due to their lack of faith and trust in their leaders and, 
by extension, the USAF.27 The CSAF also stated that for the USAF to operate in 
the future, we need “[A]irmen who are ready and responsive, and demonstrate 
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general qualities such as critical thinking, adaptive behaviors, innovation, creativ-
ity, collaboration, social networking skills, emotional and cognitive intelligence, 
initiative, and resilience.”28 These are the exact qualities that Stephen Covey de-
scribes as being the products of trust.29 Essentially, today’s Airmen need trust.
Conclusion
This research identified how commanders can build genuine trust with their 
Airmen based on relevant literature and primary data obtained from focus groups 
and individual interviews. As a result, specific actions and tasks were presented to 
aid commanders in building trust. Four themes—Engage, Connect, Serve, and 
Lead—provide a framework for what commanders can do to build trust with 
their Airmen. Research has validated that trust is about relationships.30 Our pro-
posed framework facilitates building trust through relationships.
The participants in our study represent a cross- section of the USAF by AFSC, 
rank, and age that enhances the generalizability of our findings. While our rela-
tively small sample is a limitation, the fact that every focus group and individual 
interviewed stated that the lack of trust in the USAF is a big problem that is in-
hibiting effectiveness provides credibility to our findings. 
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